Título:

Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique

Autores:

Alex Armand (U Nova, NOVAFRICA, U Nova)
Alexander Coutts (U Nova, NOVAFRICA, U Nova)
Pedro Vicente (U Nova, BREAD, NOVAFRICA, U Nova)
Ines Vilela (U Nova, NOVAFRICA, U Nova)

Revista:

American Economic Review

Ano:

2020

Volume:

110

Número:

11

Páginas:

3431-3453

Códigos JEL:

C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Q33 - Resource Booms
Q34 - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts

DOI:

10.1257/aer.20190842