Título:

From Deficits to Debt and Back: Political Incentives under Numerical Fiscal Rules

Autores:

Marco Buti (European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels)
João Nogueira Martins (European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels)
Alessandro Turrini (European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels)

Revista:

Ce Sifo Economic Studies

Ano:

2007

Volume:

53

Páginas:

115-152

Códigos JEL:

D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
E62 - Fiscal Policy; Public Expenditures, Investment, and Finance; Taxation
H62 - Deficit; Surplus
H63 - Debt; Debt Management