Autor

Nome:
Nuno Garoupa
Habilitações:
Doutoramento: U York, Economics, 1997
Licenciatura: U Nova, Economics, 1992
e-mail:
nunogaroupa@law.tamu.edu
URL:
http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/
Instituição REBIDES:
Universidade Nova de Lisboa - Faculdade de Economia (2012)
Ideas:
http://ideas.repec.org/e/pga66.html
Researcher id:
http://www.researcherid.com/rid/B-5866-2009
Artigos 62:
Ranking: CEF.UP+NIPE (average of all rankings) (2012).

Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in Latin America: The Case of Argentina. 4.4
Juan González Bertomeu, Lucia Dalla Pellegrina, Nuno Garoupa
Review Of Law And Economics, vol. 13, 2017, p. -1.

Explaining Divorce Rate Determinants: New Evidence from Spain 4.05
Dolores Jimenez-Rubio, Nuno Garoupa, Virginia Rosales
Applied Economics Letters, vol. 23, 2016, p. 461-464.

Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure 10.97
Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, Richard H. McAdams
Journal Of Legal Studies, vol. 45, 2016, p. 105-141.

Do Lawyers Induce Litigation? Evidence from Spain, 2001-2010 13.57
Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti , Nuno Garoupa
International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 44, 2015, p. 29-41.

Addressing Federal Conflicts: An Empirical Analysis of the Brazilian Supreme Court, 1988-2010 6.6
Carolina Arlota , Nuno Garoupa
Review Of Law And Economics, vol. 10, 2014, p. 137-168.

A Disruption Mechanism for Bribes 6.6
Robert D. Cooter, Nuno Garoupa
Review Of Law And Economics, vol. 10, 2014, p. 241-263.

Globalization and Deregulation of Legal Services 27.14
Nuno Garoupa
International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 38, 2014, p. 77-86.

Judging under Political Pressure: An Empirical Analysis of Constitutional Review Voting in the Spanish Constitutional Court 15.48
Nuno Garoupa, Fernando Gomez-Pomar, Veronica Grembi
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 29, 2013, p. 513-534.

Why Not Adopt a Loser-Pays-All Rule in Criminal Litigation? 13.57
Luciana Echazu, Nuno Garoupa
International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 32, 2012, p. 233-241.

Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence 13.31
Nuno Garoupa, Matteo Rizzolli
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 168, 2012, p. 224-231.

The Brady Rule May Hurt the Innocent 7.24
Nuno Garoupa, Matteo Rizzolli
American Law And Economics Review, vol. 13, 2011, p. 168-200.

The Scope of Punishment: An Economic Theory 8.86
Nuno Garoupa, Marie Obidzinski
European Journal Of Law And Economics, vol. 31, 2011, p. 237-247.

Behavior, Human Capital and the Formation of Gangs 13.92
Antony Dnes, Nuno Garoupa
Kyklos, vol. 63, 2010, p. 517-529.

Corruption and Private Law Enforcement: Theory and History 6.6
Nuno Garoupa, Daniel Klerman
Review Of Law And Economics, vol. 6, 2010, p. 0-0.

Corruption and the Distortion of Law Enforcement Effort 7.24
Luciana Echazu, Nuno Garoupa
American Law And Economics Review, vol. 12, 2010, p. 162-180.

Decoupling as Transactions Tax 16.46
Nuno Garoupa, Chris William Sanchirico
Journal Of Legal Studies, vol. 39, 2010, p. 469-496.

Belief in a Just World, Blaming the Victim, and Hate Crime Statutes 4.4
Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, Richard H. McAdams
Review Of Law And Economics, vol. 5, 2009, p. 0-0.

Least-Cost Avoidance: The Tragedy of Common Safety 23.22
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Nuno Garoupa
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 25, 2009, p. 235-261.

Scope of Liability: The Vanishing Distinction between Negligence and Strict Liability 5.91
Pablo Salvador-Coderch, Nuno Garoupa, Carlos Gomez-Liguerre
European Journal Of Law And Economics, vol. 28, 2009, p. 257-287.

Some Reflections on the Economics of Prosecutors: Mandatory vs. Selective Prosecution 27.14
Nuno Garoupa
International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 29, 2009, p. 25-28.

The English Rule with Payments Upfront 3.83
Nuno Garoupa
Portuguese Economic Journal, vol. 8, 2009, p. 177-181.

Cashing by the Hour: Why Large Law Firms Prefer Hourly Fees over Contingent Fees 23.22
Nuno Garoupa, Fernando Gomez-Pomar
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 24, 2008, p. 458-475.

Differential Victimization: Efficiency and Fairness Justifications for the Felony Murder Rule 6.6
Nuno Garoupa, Jonathan Klick
Review Of Law And Economics, vol. 4, 2008, p. 0-0.

Paying the Price for Being Caught: The Economics of Manifest and Non-Manifest Theft in Roman Law 6.6
Nuno Garoupa, Fernando Gomez
Review Of Law And Economics, vol. 4, 2008, p. 0-0.

Further Notes on Information, Corruption, and Optimal Law Enforcement 8.86
Nuno Garoupa, Mohamed Jellal
European Journal Of Law And Economics, vol. 23, 2007, p. 59-69.

On the Optimal Choice of Enforcement Technology: An Efficiency Explanation of Privacy Rights 14.89
Nuno Garoupa
Revue Economique, vol. 58, 2007, p. 1353-1362.

Optimal Law Enforcement and Criminal Organization 37.59
Nuno Garoupa
Journal Of Economic Behavior And Organization, vol. 63, 2007, p. 461-474.

A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism 11.38
Nuno Garoupa, Jonathan Klick, Francesco Parisi
Public Choice, vol. 128, 2006, p. 147-168.

A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants 16.46
Nuno Garoupa, Anthony Ogus
Journal Of Legal Studies, vol. 35, 2006, p. 339-363.

US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees: Agency Problems and the Supply of Legal Services 9.38
Winand Emons, Nuno Garoupa
Managerial And Decision Economics, vol. 27, 2006, p. 379-385.

Academic Tenure, Posttenure Effort, and Contractual Damages 17.01
Antony Dnes, Nuno Garoupa
Economic Inquiry, vol. 43, 2005, p. 831-839.

Externality and Organizational Choice in Franchising 6.02
Antony Dnes, Nuno Garoupa
Journal of Economics And Business, vol. 57, 2005, p. 139-149.

The Choice of Titling System in Land 22.59
Benito Arrunada, Nuno Garoupa
Journal Of Law And Economics, vol. 48, 2005, p. 709-727.

Corruption and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions 13.57
Nuno Garoupa, Daniel Klerman
International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 24, 2004, p. 219-225.

Dynamic Law Enforcement with Learning 23.22
Nuno Garoupa, Mohamed Jellal
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 20, 2004, p. 192-206.

Optimal Law Enforcement with Legal Aid 14.77
Nuno Garoupa, Frank Stephen
Economica, vol. 71, 2004, p. 493-500.

Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes: An Economic Analysis 7.24
Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa
American Law And Economics Review, vol. 6, 2004, p. 185-207.

Punish once or punish twice: A theory of the use of criminal sanctions in addition to regulatory penalties 7.24
Nuno Garoupa, Fernando Gomez-Pomar
American Law And Economics Review, vol. 6, 2004, p. 410-433.

Behavioral Economic Analysis of Crime: A Critical Review 17.72
Nuno Garoupa
European Journal Of Law And Economics, vol. 15, 2003, p. 5-15.

Crime and Social Norms 3.83
Nuno Garoupa
Portuguese Economic Journal, vol. 2, 2003, p. 131-144.

Efficient Deterrence Does Not Require That the Wealthy Should Be Able to Buy Justice 13.31
Nuno Garoupa, Hugh Gravelle
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 159, 2003, p. 545-552.

An Economic Theory of Church Strictness 24.79
Pedro Pita Barros, Nuno Garoupa
Economic Journal, vol. 112, 2002, p. 559-576.

A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information 8.86
Nuno Garoupa, Mohamed Jellal
European Journal Of Law And Economics, vol. 14, 2002, p. 5-13.

A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning 17.07
Nuno Garoupa, João Gata
Public Choice, vol. 110, 2002, p. 41-65.

Household Dissolution, Child Care and Divorce Law 13.57
Roger Bowles, Nuno Garoupa
International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 22, 2002, p. 495-510.

Optimal Deterrence with Legal Defense Expenditure 17.01
Hugh Gravelle, Nuno Garoupa
Economic Inquiry, vol. 40, 2002, p. 366-379.

Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent]Seeking Government 7.24
Nuno Garoupa, Daniel Klerman
American Law And Economics Review, vol. 4, 2002, p. 116-140.

Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines 47.73
Nuno Garoupa
European Economic Review, vol. 45, 2001, p. 1765-1771.

Corporate Criminal Law and Organization Incentives: A Managerial Perspective 18.76
Nuno Garoupa
Managerial And Decision Economics, vol. 21, 2000, p. 243-252.

Economic Analysis of the Removal of Illegal Gains 9.05
Roger Bowles, Michael Faure, Nuno Garoupa
International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 20, 2000, p. 537-549.

Reputation, Honesty, and Efficiency with Insider Information: An Experiment 21.28
Gary Charness, Nuno Garoupa
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 9, 2000, p. 425-451.

The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement 34.01
Nuno Garoupa
Economic Inquiry, vol. 38, 2000, p. 278-288.

An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach to the Theory of International Regimes 7.0
Nuno Garoupa, João Gata
Defence And Peace Economics, vol. 10, 1999, p. 225-246.

Dishonesty and Libel Law: The Economics of the "Chilling" Effect 26.62
Nuno Garoupa
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 155, 1999, p. 284-300.

Optimal Law Enforcement with Dissemination of Information 17.72
Nuno Garoupa
European Journal Of Law And Economics, vol. 7, 1999, p. 183-196.

The Economics of Political Dishonesty and Defamation 27.14
Nuno Garoupa
International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 19, 1999, p. 167-180.

Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information When Wealth Varies among Individuals 29.54
Nuno Garoupa
Economica, vol. 65, 1998, p. 479-490.

A Note on Private Enforcement and Type I Error 27.14
Nuno Garoupa
International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 17, 1997, p. 423-429.

Casual Police Corruption and the Economics of Crime 13.57
Roger Bowles, Nuno Garoupa
International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 17, 1997, p. 75-87.

Optimal Law Enforcement and the Economics of the Drug Market: Some Comments on the Schengen Agreements 27.14
Nuno Garoupa
International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 17, 1997, p. 521-535.

The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement 27.68
Nuno Garoupa
Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 11, 1997, p. 267-295.

Portugal-European Union Convergence: Some Evidence 14.57
Pedro Pita Barros, Nuno Garoupa
European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 12, 1996, p. 545-553.

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